The Universal State Corporate Offer to contract:

Bill Title: Relative to registration of commercial motor vehicles and operator's/drivers' licenses.

Spectrum: Partisan Bill (Republican 3-0)

18-2144                             03/10

AN ACT relative to registration of commercial motor vehicles and operator's/drivers' licenses.


This bill restates the "right to travel" and requires the department of safety (DMV) to provide at no cost to all noncommercial automobile and noncommercial conveyance owners a decal and identification card that states the holder is exempt from registering his or her private conveyance under the Uniform Commercial Code exemption for consumer goods and household goods.


In the Year of Our Lord Two Thousand Eighteen

AN ACT relative to registration of commercial motor vehicles and operator's/drivers' licenses.

Be it Enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Court convened:

1 Statement of Purpose. The general court finds that the authority of the department of safety is limited to only the commercial users of the public ways and that the corporate state employees have, by their silence, failed to fully inform the sovereign people of this state that an automobile has been confirmed by Chief Justice Grimes, in 108 N.H. 386, to be "private property" defined by current (UCC 9-109), as "household goods" and "consumer goods" not for commercial use or for profit or gain. Further, the courts (Federal and state) have found that corporate public servants who ignore their accountability as mandated in (United States Constitution) Bill of Rights have by their silence and failure to fully inform the sovereign people of the consequences arising from the corporate "offer to contract," is deemed silent deception and inducement by fraud (A list of several cases published in unpublished are documented below).

I. For the purposes of this section:

(a) "Automobile" and "motorcycle" means any self-propelled conveyance used for noncommercial travel upon the public ways.
(b) "Motor vehicle" means any self-propelled conveyance designed and used upon the public ways for profit or gain in business or commerce.
(c) "Household goods" or "consumer goods" has the same meaning as the Uniform Commercial Code found at RSA 382-A:9-102 and shall include an automobile. Automobiles and all noncommercial conveyances shall be exempt from the license and registration required of commercial motor vehicles.
(d) "Operator" or "driver" means one who controls the movement of a conveyance upon the public way for commercial or business purposes.
(e) "Traveler" means one who controls the automobile or other noncommercial conveyance.
(f) "Common law" means the sole remedy for any controversy arising from or by the public use of household goods or consumer goods such as an automobile or other noncommercial conveyance.

II. The department of safety shall provide, at no cost..

II. The department of safety shall provide, at no cost, every noncommercial automobile owner or owner of an other noncommercial conveyance with an appropriate decal imprinted with the words "RSA 382-A:9-109 Exempt." The division of motor vehicles shall also issue all noncommercial traveler a photo identification card at no cost with the words "RSA 382-A:9-109 Exempt" printed on such identification card. This identification card is not a contract or a license or instrument that would require compelled performance by the holder and shall provide every law enforcement agency with notice of the holder's exemption from the statutes that are required for the commercial use of the public way for profit or gain.

III. The automobile and all noncommercial conveyances...

  • III. The automobile and all noncommercial conveyances are exempt from registration and taxation and the owner of such automobile or noncommercial conveyance are exempt from the requirement of a license that is necessary for commercial use of the public ways. The owner of the automobile shall be considered to be exercising the common unalienable "Right to Travel on the public right-of-way in the ordinary and lawful pursuit of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."
    3 Vanity Plate Fees. Amend RSA 263:52, I to read as follows:
    I. The proceeds from [original license fees as provided in RSA 263:42 and] the vanity plate service fee collected in accordance with RSA 261:89, plus the fee for the renewal of the use of such plates, after any refunding authorized by law and costs of such plates or designation of effective periods thereof and issuance of same have been appropriated and deducted, shall be expended for course materials, licensing of schools, and certification of instructors in connection with safe motor vehicle driving conducted in or under the supervision of secondary schools. Such balance shall be kept in a separate fund. The commissioner of safety shall adopt, pursuant to RSA 541-A, and publish, rules governing the courses of instruction and training.

What have the courts decided?

     “The parties to a contract have no obligation to check the terms on a periodic basis to learn whether they have been changed by the other side.1 Indeed, a party can’t unilaterally change the terms of a contract; it must obtain the other party’s consent before doing so.  Union Pac. R.R. v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 549 F.2d 114, 118 (9th Cir. 1976).

     This is because a revised contract is merely an offer and does not bind the parties until it is accepted.  Matanuska Valley Farmers Cooperating Ass ’n v. Monaghan, 188 F.2d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 1951). And generally “an offeree cannot actually assent to an offer unless he knows of its existence.” Samuel Williston & Richard A. Lord, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 4:13, at 365 (4th ed. 1990); see also Trimble v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 255 N.Y.S. 292, 297 (App. Div. 1932) (“An offer may not be accepted until it is made and brought to the attention of the one accepting”).

     Even if Douglas’s continued use of Talk America’s service could be considered assent, such assent can only be inferred after he received proper notice of the proposed changes. Douglas claims that no such notice was given. The error reflects fundamental misapplications of contract law and goes to the heart of petitioner’s claim.”

     This simply means that the government may send you a notice, that is in disguise a contract, without ever having to tell you that "this is an offer to contract", and that by your receiving this offer, a constitute your accepting our offer and the terms and conditions associated with the offer.  The New Hampshire's State legislature, its Supreme Court, and State governor have all agreed, that their failure to inform you is as the courts have stated, is silent deception and inducement to fraud.

A contract that is introduced by one party, to another, that does not require the other signature, is called a unilateral contract.

     As noted above the only thing required in a unilateral contract is that the other party be notified, and that the parties have a pre-existing relationship and/or duty to the other.

     The pre-existing relationship between you and the government, or you and your utility service company is well established, which is why they can send you a notice incorporating you into a contract thereby obligating you to the terms of their contract, so the question is: why can't you do the same thing.

Please visit 9 USC 2 and 9 USC 6 for better understanding of why arbitration is your way to balance the scale and correct the damage.

Government contracts can not be deceptive and/or fraudulent.

     "The corporate state employees have, by their silence, failed to fully inform the sovereign people of ... the consequences arising from the corporate (State and Federal Agencies as well as other private corporations) "offer to contract," is deemed silent deception and inducement by fraud".


The United States Supreme Court Official decision:

"Silence can only be equated with fraud when there is a legal or moral duty to speak, or when an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading... We cannot condone this shocking conduct... If that is the case we hope our message is clear. This sort of deception will not be tolerated and if this is routine it should be corrected immediately"
U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F2d 297, 299-300 


 The State of Arizona and Others have said:

"...If they proposed to rescind, their duty was to assert that right promptly, unconditionally, and invasively,"
Richardson v. Lowe, 149 Fed. 625, 79 C. C. A. 317.

"Fraud maybe committed by failure to speak, but a duty to speak must be imposed,"
Dunahay v. Struzik, 393 P.2d 930, 96 Ariz. 246 (1964).

Cases cited by the court
Batty v. Arizona State Dental Board, 112 P.2d 870 (Ariz. 1941)
Sadler v. Arizona Flour Mills Co., 121 P.2d 412 (Ariz. 1942)
Chiricahua Ranches Co. v. State, 39 P.2d 640 (Ariz. 1934)
Employers Casualty Co. v. Moore, 142 P.2d 414 (Ariz. 1943)
Honk v. Karlson, 292 P.2d 455 (Ariz. 1956)



"Suppression of a material fact which a party is bound in good faith to disclose is equivalent to a false representation." Leigh v. Loyd, 244 P.2d 356, 74 Ariz. 84- (1952)

"When one conveys a false impression by disclosure of some facts and the concealment of others, such concealment is in effect a false representation that what is disclosed is the whole truth."
State v. Coddington, 662 P.2d 155,135 Ariz. 480 ( Ariz. App. 1983)

Formento v. Encanto Business Park (1987)
State v. Carrasco (2001)
Hill v. Jones (1986)
Sigmen v. Arizona Dept. of Real Estate (1991)
Lindsey v. Edgar (1984)
Authorities (4)
This opinion cites:

Dennis v. Thomson, 43 S.W.2d 18 (Ky. Ct. App. 1931)
State v. Hall, 633 P.2d 398 (Ariz. 1981)
Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa v. Halsey, Stuart & ...
Schock v. Jacka, 460 P.2d 185 (Ariz. 1969)

"Fraud and deceit may arise from silence where there is a duty to speak the truth, as well as from speaking an untruth."
Morrison v Acton, 198 P.2d 590, 68 Ariz. 27 ( Ariz. 1948)

This case has been cited by these opinions:

Fernandi v. Strully (1961)
Nichols v. City of Phoenix (1949)
Wilkinson v. Harrington (1968)
GUST, ROSENFELD v. Prudential Ins. (1995)
Sato v. Van Denburgh (1979)

Authorities (22)
This opinion cites:

Barham v. Widing, 291 P. 173 (Cal. 1930)
Whetstine v. Moravec, 291 N.W. 425 (Iowa 1940)
Boyce v. Brown, 77 P.2d 455 (Ariz. 1938)
In Re McDonnell's Estate, 179 P.2d 238 (Ariz. 1947)
Burton v. Tribble, 70 S.W.2d 503 (Ark. 1934)



"Damages will lie in proper case of negligent misrepresentation of failure to disclose."
Van Buren v. Pima Community College Dist Bd., 546 P.2d 821, 113 Ariz. 85 (Ariz.1976)

Bankr. L. Rep. P 69,327 in Re Cochise College Park, Inc., Bankrupt, ... (1983)
Wells Fargo Bank v. Arizona Laborers (2002)
Donnelly Const. Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland (1984)
Elinor S. Nelson, ph.d., a Single Person v. Pima Community College, Pima ... (1996)
Standard Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhouse (1997)
Authorities (4)
This opinion cites:

Nielson v. Flashberg, 419 P.2d 514 (Ariz. 1966)
Arizona Title Ins. & T. Co. v. O'Malley Lbr. Co., ...
West v. Soto, 336 P.2d 153 (Ariz. 1959)
Odom v. First National Bank of Arizona, 336 P.2d 141 (Ariz. 1959)

"Where one under duty to disclose facts to another fails to do so, and other is injured thereby, an action in tort lies against party whose failure to perform his duty caused injury." Regan v. First Nat. Bank, 101 P.2d 214, 55 Ariz. 320 ( Ariz. 1940)

This case has been cited by these opinions:

Davis v. Kleindienst (1946)
Lakin Cattle Company v. Engelthaler (1966)
Visco v. Universal Refuse Removal Company (1969)
De Maio v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company (1967)
Weir v. Galbraith (1962)

Authorities (3)
This opinion cites:

Moore v. Meyers, 253 P. 626 (Ariz. 1927)
Stewart v. Phoenix Nat. Bank, 64 P.2d 101 (Ariz. 1937)
Munger v. Boardman, 88 P.2d 536 (Ariz. 1939)

"Where relation of trust or confidence exists between two parties so that one places peculiar reliance in trustworthiness of another, latter is under duty to make full and truthful disclosure of all material facts and is liable for misrepresentation or concealment."
Stewart v. Phoenix Nat. Bank, 64 P.2d 101, 49 Ariz. 34- ( Ariz. 1937)

This case has been cited by these opinions:

Standard Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhouse (1997)
Parker v. Columbia Bank (1992)
Capital Bank v. MVB, Inc. (1994)
McAlister v. Citibank (1992)
Phelps Dodge Corporation v. Ford (1949)
Authorities (6)
This opinion cites:

Butler v. Eaton, 141 U.S. 240
Bienville Water Supply Co. v. Mobile, 186 U.S. 212
Cogburn v. Callier, 104 So. 328 (Ala. 1925)
Craemer v. Washington, 168 U.S. 124
Schneider v. Decker, 291 P. 80 (Okla. 1930)

"Concealing a material fact when there is duty to disclose may be actionable fraud."
Universal Inv. Co. v. Sahara Motor Inn, Inc., 619 P-2d 485,127 Ariz. 213- (Ariz. App. 1980)  

This case has been cited by these opinions:

Mid Kansas Fed. S. & L. v. Dynamic Dev. (1991)
S Dev. Co. v. Pima Capital Mgmt. Co. (2001)
Nordstrom, Inc. v. Maricopa County (2004)
TruServ Corp. v. Morgan's Tool & Supply Co. (2012)
Hill v. Jones (1986)
Authorities (9)
This opinion cites:

Bank of Italy Etc. Assn. v. Bentley, 20 P.2d 940 (Cal. 1933)
Neal v. Neal, 570 P.2d 758 (Ariz. 1977)
Nat. Housing Indus. v. El Jones Develop. Co., 576 P.2d ...
Cohen v. Citizens Nat. Trust Etc. Bank, 143 Cal. App. ...
Sanfran Co. v. Rees Blow Pipe Mfg. Co., 168 Cal. ...

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There is a lot of effort to keep from public view the fact that the United Nations is an arbitration tribunal. When the League of Nations was established 1916-1919 it was designed to help nations resolve their differences without resorting to violence and warfare. The United Nations was established under the same principle and the administrative courts in the United States follow the exact same principle.

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